World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies

Barcelona, July 19th - 24th 2010

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CITIZENSHIP IN THE ARAB WORLD: A ROOTING AND EVOLVING CONCEPT? - 1/2: MENA States and Their Citizens (308) - NOT_DEFINED activity_field_Panel
 

· NOT_DEFINED date: THU 22, 9.00-11.00 am

· NOT_DEFINED institution: The American University in Cairo (Egypt)

· NOT_DEFINED organizer: Gianluca P. Parolin

· NOT_DEFINED language: English/Français

· NOT_DEFINED description: The theoretical debate on citizenship emerged in the Arab world at the turn of the 20th century along with the discourse on the nation-state. The dispute soon focused on the status of non-Muslims in an Islamic state. Instead of looking into the concept of citizenship and defining its contents (viz. the position of the individual vis-à-vis the state and the bundle of rights attached to citizenship), intellectuals and reformers engaged in arguments over the equality of Muslims and non-Muslims in an Arab-Islamic state.
Since the end of the 20th century the debate on citizenship has gained renewed impetus and interest, mainly as a result of external pressure on the status of women in the Arab-Islamic context. The risk, however, is to fall into the same circularity as in the past. Lately, Arab politicians and media are increasingly bringing citizenship into the public discourse. The greater recurrence of the terms ‘citizen’ and ‘citizenship’ does not by itself guarantee the achievement of a corresponding advancement.
The purpose of this series of (two) panels is to look at how the concept of citizenship is taking root and evolving in the region from an interdisciplinary perspective. The preliminary panel proposal met with such enthusiasm that allowed for a selection of distinguished speakers with different backgrounds and perspectives on the issue.
The first panel delves at the roots of the notion of citizenship in the region, looking at its connection to the problematic configuration of emerging modern states and their contemporary developments. Historically, a fascinating case study is the conflicting perspectives of Ottoman authorities and France on the citizenship of Algerians during the 19th and early 20th century. It sheds considerable light on the shaping of the concept when high diplomatic and political reasons are at stake and the concept of “the Algerian” is somehow in the making. If we consider internal disagreement on the shaping of modern states and –foremost– their demos as the legacy of modernity in the political arena of the region, then three exceptionally interesting case studies come immediately to mind: the determination of Palestinian citizenship in its connection to a certain political solution to the territorial disputes, and the impact of citizenship policies on a country’s demographic balance – by means of political naturalizations as in Bahrain, or of external citizenship benefits as in Lebanon. Conversely, when a strong ideology outwardly shapes citizenship legislation and policies, as pan-Arabism in Syria, the Iraqi refugee crisis might put it to the test and reveal other, deeper conceptions of citizenship.

Chair: Gianluca P. Parolin (Law Department, The American University in Cairo)

Paper presenter: Noureddine Amara (Paris I, Pantheon-Sorbonne, France), “Conflicting Citizenships: Algerians residing in Ottoman Territories (1834-1911)”
L’analyse du régime de la protection diplomatique des Algériens établis hors de France et d’Algérie, au cours de la domination coloniale de l’Algérie, conduit à interroger les pratiques de la nationalité algérienne mises en œuvre par l’administration coloniale. Les autorités consulaires, en relation avec leurs ambassades de tutelle, le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et le Garde des Sceaux français, agissent souvent de concert dans la détermination juridique des populations admises à jouir de cette protection. Cette dernière est un corollaire de la qualité de français qui, conformément à la théorie de la succession des Etats, est reconnue aux populations indigènes d’Algérie. Il revient donc à définir la population indigène. Dans ce cas de figure, l’indigénat, en plus des significations que cette expression revêt dans d’autres branches du droit, notamment en droit pénal, agit comme une catégorie de droit renvoyant à une nationalité d’origine des populations originaires des territoires conquis par la France. Cette « nationalité algérienne » est règlementée par la circulaire La Valette de 1869, le sénatus-consulte de 1865, le décret Crémieux de 1870 et son décret d’application de 1871. Des textes dont la matière saisie est la définition de la qualité de Français car si l’indigénat agit bien comme un substitut à la nationalité algérienne, c’est que cette dernière est admise comme une nationalité intermédiaire entre les nationaux français d’origine et ces Algériens admis à cette qualité de Français par les effets de la conquête. Nous pouvons avancer que cette nationalité algérienne est une nationalité d’empire à usage interne au sens où ses effets juridiques s’éteignent en dehors de l’exercice de la souveraineté française.
Dans cette opération de saisie par le droit de la nationalité d’origine des Algériens, de nombreux conflits d’interprétation surgissent entre les autorités françaises et les autorités souveraines des territoires sur lesquels résident les Algériens, entres autres, l’Empire ottoman. En effet, la pratique juridique de cette nationalité algérienne d’empire n’est pas sans produire d’effets en dehors du cadre administratif dans lequel les autorités françaises ont voulu la circonscrire. La délivrance aux Algériens de « certificat de nationalité algérienne » a maintes fois eu des résonances diplomatiques entre la France et la Porte Ottomane. En effet, cette pièce d’identité servait aux Algériens résidant dans les territoires ottomans qui la présentaient aux autorités locales afin de se soustraire aux juridictions de la Porte. Seulement ce « certificat de nationalité algérienne » était lui-même opposé à la France par les autorités locales de la Porte afin de revendiquer la sujétion ottomane des Algériens. Dans la correspondance entre les Consuls de France en territoires ottomans et les autorités de la Porte, transparaît la question de la reconnaissance par la Porte de la conquête et de l’annexion de l’ancienne Régence d’Alger décidée unilatéralement par la France. Cette dernière n’aurait pas produit d’effets ni en droit international public ni en droit international privé par défaut de traité international réglant la succession des Etats. La Porte admet donc la fixation du domicile de ces Algériens en territoire ottoman comme l’expression de leur manifestation tacite d’un droit d’option en faveur de la sujétion ottomane. Naissent alors des conflits de nationalité : chacune des deus puissances opposant à l’autre l’allégeance des Algériens à leur autorité. En tant que nationalité intermédiaire, dans l’ordre juridique international, la qualité d’Algérien peut tout aussi bien être mobilisée par les autorités ottomanes à l’appui de leurs prétentions souveraines sur ces populations. L’analyse de l’argumentaire juridique employé à l’appui des prétentions de ces deux pays me permet de déplacer l’étude de cette nationalité algérienne dans le champ du droit international public. De même, elle rend indispensable la compréhension du phénomène de succession d’empires dans l’appréhension de l’indigénat algérien. Pour ces cas d’espèces, le corpus d’archives est composé de la correspondance diplomatique entre le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de la Porte et l’Ambassade de France à Constantinople ; ainsi que de la correspondance entre les consuls généraux et les Vali ottomans.
Dans l’analyse de ces conflits de nationalité, dans quelle mesure le règlement des cas d’espèces est admis comme dérogatoire aux principes généraux du droit international public ? Notons, que ces principes du droit des gens sont souvent écartés autant par la France et l’Empire ottoman lorsque ces deux puissances sont liées par une convergence d’intérêt. Cette histoire de la nationalité algérienne en territoire ottoman gagne en intelligibilité si nous la raccordons à l’histoire des relations diplomatiques entre les puissances européennes et l’Empire ottoman. La loi sur la nationalité ottomane du 19 janvier 1869 donne une acuité plus aigue à cette question de la nationalité des Algériens. La France estime qu’elle porte atteinte au droit international et à ses « privilèges » issus de ses capitulations.

Paper presenter: Asem Khalil (Birzeit University, OPT), “(Re)Shaping the Nation through the State:The Impact of Nationality Law(s) on the Palestinian People”
In this paper, I speculate about the impact of the creation of a Palestinian state on the Palestinian nation. I will argue that the Palestinian state, within the framework of the two-state solution, will inevitably consolidate the distinction between a (Palestinian) citizen and a (Palestinian) national and that, accordingly, it will shape, gradually but definitively, the Palestinian nation. Special attention will be given to the impact on Palestinian refugees, both those who have acquired the nationality of host countries, or those who remained stateless.
Although largely theoretical, my reflection will build on the conclusions I reached elsewhere, based on a survey of major legal and historical developments in Palestine since the British mandate until the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, with particular focus on nationality law(s). I will show how the law was not used to reflect national interest, or popular will; rather, it served as a tool for the realization of a colonial project.
The above argument is insinuating that the ‘Palestinian state’ seems to be positioned within the same trajectory that was put in motion since the British Mandate. If my speculation is correct, then, it is reasonable to question why the state, not the people, is increasingly occupying the centrality of internal Palestinian debate. Why narratives of ‘authority’, ‘independence’ and ‘law’ are replacing narratives of ‘revolution’, ‘liberation’ and ‘rights’? I will argue that the apparent incoherence is misleading in that it fits perfectly within the hegemonic vision of a world order, largely centered on sovereignty, not self-determination.
In this paper I intend to challenge this distorted vision and argue that, if a Palestinian state is to be created, then it has to be a success. The law can be targeted this time to convert the process: it shall contribute to building nationality based on emancipation and inclusion not oppression and exclusion. This is the only way for Palestinians to reconcile with the ‘law’ and use it to build their own state.
Some may contest, rightly, that my argument does not appear to be different from the one that is put in motion. In fact, despite suggesting a different trajectory, my argument falls largely within the same orbit: it uses the same theoretical paradigm (state-centered) and the same tools for change (law-centered). This is correct, in that the argument I suggest reflect largely my conviction that time of ‘full revolution’ is over (admittingly it was possible one day!) and that change is possible for the future that we may still determine, not the past that we have completely lost the control.
In other words, the approach I suggest is different from the one that is put in motion in the same way choice is different from submission, action from reaction, planning from arbitrariness. The outcome of the two approaches may still be very similar; however, the approach I suggest has the advantage of re-introducing ‘self-determination’, not the state per se, at the center of the debate.

Paper presenter: Abdulhadi Khalaf (Lund University, Sweden), “Tajnees – Naturalization as an instrument of recruiting loyal subjects”
This paper is part of an ongoing research on the trajectory of rhetoric of political reforms in Bahrain during the past 10-years of reign by king Hamad bin Isa. Within less than two years of his reign, the king abandoned his wide ranging blueprints for political and institutional reforms designed to end to a decade-long civil unrest.
I argue that the king continues to use, albeit more creatively, several of the instruments of rule employed by the authoritarian regime of his father. One of these instruments is reliance on naturalization, tajnees to achieve a variety of demographic, political and social objectives.
Following his accession to throne in March 1999, King Hamad bin Isa exercised this right to grant citizenship, en masse, to several hundreds of bidoons. The move was heartily hailed by various political groupings in the country.
The legal procedures of naturalization are clearly specified in Bahraini’s constitution and laws. These include living continuously in the country for at least 15 years. However, the monarch has a discretionary power to grant citizenship to persons who do not meet the specified requirements.
Since 1999, the process of tajnees has expanded through generous reliance on the royal discretionary power to grant citizenship. The number of Bahraini citizens rose from some 409,619 in 2001 to 527,433 in 2007. Beneficiaries of tajnees include people who are not even resident of the country. Critics of tajnees allege that the process as an abuse of the king’s constitutional privileges. They also note that the process of tajnees lacks transparency and is carried out without proper parliamentary insight.
Several sets objectives are cited by critics of the current forms of tajnees in Bahrain. They allege that the regime hopes to alter the demographic structure of the country, a claim that explains why most beneficiaries of the royal tajnees are Sunnis hailing from Baluchistan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen¬. En masse naturalization provides the regime with a demographic pool for recruiting personnel to man the expanding Bahrain’s military and security apparatuses. The availability of this pool of loyal citizens would allow the regime to maintain the current ban on Shia joining these services. Another criticism of tajnees refers to the electoral considerations which encourage the regime to enfranchise categories of residents and non-residents of the country in order to help pro-regime groups to prevail in parliamentary and municipal elections.
Further, I contend that the current forms of tajnees could lead to institutionalizing ’differentiated citizenship’, where rights and entitlements are allocated on the basis of group characteristics backgrounds and loyalty to the king. While differentiated citizenship may be advantageous instrument of authoritarian rule, it is highly risky and could generate problems of its own. In the long term, differentiated citizenship increases constrains against social integration. It also limits incentives to cultivate national cohesion as it links citizenship rights and entitlement to belonging to one or the other of the citizenship categories.

Paper presenter: Melkar El-Khoury (Lebanese Emigration Research Center / Notre Dame University, Lebanon), “Citizenship Rights of the Lebanese Diaspora: A Roadmap to Returning Home”
This paper aims at examining citizenship rights of the Lebanese Diaspora in the light of existing legal provisions and pending bills dealing with the acquisition of the Lebanese nationality by individuals of Lebanese origins living abroad. Throughout this paper, I will try to understand whether the law and draft laws are motivated by human rights objectives or by purely political drives. In the first part, I will examine existing legislations pertaining to the subject. This section will mainly focus on the 1946 law and its severe condition of permanent return to Lebanon as a prerequisite for individuals of Lebanese origins seeking the acquisition of the Lebanese nationality. I will also discuss briefly the development of various arguments upholding or objecting to Lebanese Diaspora citizenship rights.
In the second part, I will look at pending bills including the draft law presented by the Maronite League, its provisions and rationale and a pending government proposal that would permit descendants of Lebanese emigrants to acquire an overseas identity card. This part will also deal with the recognition of the 2008 electoral law of the right of Lebanese emigrants living abroad to vote in the 2013 legislative elections.
The third part will address the reasons behind the law that prevents Lebanese women from transmitting their nationality to their children and husbands, and pending bills in this regard. The recognition of this right would facilitate the acquisition of Lebanese nationality for individuals born abroad to Lebanese mother.

Paper presenter: Sophia Hoffmann (Department of Politics and International Studies, SOAS), “Syrian Citizenship, Sovereignty and the Iraqi Refugee Crisis”
The granting and withholding of citizenship is one of the principal acts of state sovereignty, an exclusionary mechanism through which states control access to the polity and its associated rights. Further, it is also a key power through which states legitimize, maintain and perform their existence – towards their own citizens, outsiders as well as other states. The Syrian state presents an interesting paradox: on the one hand, citizenship is extremely protected and can only be obtained by birth to a male, Syrian citizen, or through a personal decree by the president, which in practice is never given. In the past, the withdrawal of citizenship has been used to control Kurdish populations, believed to be hostile to the state. On the other hand, due to the Syrian government’s support for pan-Arabism, Arabic nationals, while not being awarded full citizenship rights, have generally enjoyed easy access to Syria as an ‘in-between’ category between citizen and foreigner. An example of this is the generous support extended by the Syrian government to Palestinian refugees, which enjoy quasi-citizenship and have access to all public services, including public sector jobs.
The recent Iraqi refugees crisis has brought the contradictions between the concepts of Syrian citizenship and pan-Arabism to a breaking point: Iraqis are now strictly controlled by a visa and residence regime, and their access to public services and the labour market are limited. This paper uses the Iraqi refugees as a lens through which to analyse the way citizenship is operationalised by the Syrian state as a mechanism of sovereignty and what it tells us about the shape of the Syrian state in general and how it exercises its power.