World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies

Barcelona, July 19th - 24th 2010


Cold War and Colonial Legacies: The 50s and 60s (373) - Panel

· Date: THU, 22 / 5-7 pm

· Language: English / Français

· Description: Chair: Radoslaw Bania (Assistant Professor, University of Lodz, Poland)

Paper presenter: Lamia Bougrioua (Enseignante chercheur-University of Batna, Algeria), “The Relationship between Algerian Revolution and the Arab Maghreb”
The theme of the Maghreb relations during the Algerian liberation revolution 1954 -1962 is one of other contentious issues in the history of the Maghreb today, and by virtue of the impact of the Algerian revolution, the deep politics of the Maghreb and the major implications on bilateral relations. These relations have been subjected to many of developments, and informed politicians and historians, many of the problems, and stressed the importance of studying objectively in order to understand the history of contemporary Maghreb. The outbreak of the Algerian revolution with the development issues of Tunisia and Morocco to the rehabilitation of the project and the struggle of the Arab Maghreb unity, as a totalitarian revolutionary project was very frightening for France, which was overtaken by a new policy required by granting independence to Tunisia and Morocco and to keep Algeria. And thus the Maghreb national movements were confronted by a difficult balance between the aspirations of country and service unit project of the Maghreb. The Algerian revolution unexpectedly withstood in the face of French politics, and with the independence of the Maghreb countries, and led to the creation of extensions of complex and major consequences on the situation of these countries, internal and external, particularly in its relations with France, which made it the coexistence of the Algerian revolution and confirm their interest in the issue of solidarity of Algeria, and more clearly to the French authorities could not keep Algeria a colony between the two independent sisters. The problem in this subject is to search for foundations linked to the central relationships of the Algerian revolution in the Maghreb region through a focus on providing the following questions - Is able to Algerian revolution depending on alliances Maghreb to impose its strategy, calling for Maghreb? What are the limits of politics adopted by the solidarity of the Algerian revolution in its relations with governments and official authority, and how the three countries responded to the requests for support of the Algerian revolution, and the impact on the development of bilateral relations and solidarity Alyparwa Maghreb? How have the decisions of the Tangier on the relations of Algeria - Maghreb, and why the unit has not been achieved for the real solidarity with Algeria?

Paper presenter: Rinna Kullaa (Post doctoral fellow-Columbia University), “The Non-Aligned Movement in the Mediterranean: 1956-1964”
The Non-Aligned Movement in the Mediterranean 1956-1964My primary research interest is the post-war diplomatic and regional history of the Mediterranean. This paper argues hat the shared history of the Mediterranean did not end as the era of the Great Powers was finished. The political and cultural narratives of the northern and southern Mediterranean states remained intertwined during the Cold War. Much of this shared experience was prompted by Superpower rivalry in the area between the United States and the Soviet Union. The paper builds a case study around the example of the Non-Aligned Movement that extended across Algeria, Cyprus, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, Yugoslavia and Egypt; the policy of Non-Alignment is described as tackling both European colonialism and the influence of the United States and the Soviet Union. I argue that the Non-Aligned Movement was conceived of and formed in the Mediterranean between 1956 and 1961. The impetus for this birth of this organization came from Josip Broz ‘Tito’ of Yugoslavia, and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The goal of my current work is to identify the Non-Aligned Movement as a significant part of the Cold War in the Mediterranean. I examine the movement and ask the question to what extent the movement helped bridged the cultural and social history of the Mediterranean. This paper analyzes the structure of international relations in the Mediterranean surrounding the Non-Aligned Movement that contribute to its narrative. The paper asks questions such as: what if any, were the combined political and cultural effects of Soviet sales of arms to Egypt and simultaneous student exchanges between Egypt and Yugoslavia? How extensive was the cooperation between the Non-Aligned States within its conferences in Belgrade 1961 and in Cairo 1964?

Paper presenter: Mansoureh Ebrahimi and Kamaruzaman Yusoff (PhD Candidate/ Lecturer-School of History, Politics and Strategic Studies National University of Malaysia), “Coup d’État against Mosaddeq 1953: A Critical Analysis on the British Documents”
The purpose of the study is to elucidate the British involvement in August 1953 coup against Mosaddeq. Qualitative approach has been used to examine how British documents have shed a new light to the history of the 1953 coup. After the successful coup, the British took certain measures, after consultations, to impress people that Mosaddeq was not a capable leader to bring Iran to be a developed nation. The British also tried to prove that Mosaddeq was not a favourable leader from the eyes of the Shah. As a result the Shah maintained full control in the government.

Paper presenter: Radoslaw Bania (Assistant Professor- University of Lodz, Poland), "British military intervention in Kuwait in 1961 and its consequences for the British-Kuwait relations in the 60's of the 20th century"
In 1899 Kuwait and the Great Britain signed the Exclusive Treaty. From that time the sheikhdom of Kuwait felt into political dependence from the United Kingdom. This situation lasted till the beginning of the 60's. After the fall of the British dominance in the Iranian oil industry in the first half of the 50's, the small sheikhdom became the most important single source of oil for the Great Britain. Also the Kuwait's oil revenues were invested in the British economy.At the beginning of the 60's the spread of the nationalistic ideas over the whole Middle East caused the British to grant the independence to Kuwait. On 19 June, 1961, Kuwait and the Great Britain signed the Exchange of Notes that ended the existence of the 1899 Treaty. Kuwait became sovereign and independent country. But the British government was able to secure for itself the right to military intervention in the territory of the emirate when the Kuwait's security would be endangered. The proclamation of the Kuwait's independence was not accepted by the Iraq under the rule of general Kassim. The Iraqi prime minister described Kuwait as a historical part of his country and claimed that she should be incorporated into Iraq even by force. This proclamation caused the British government to react. In accordance with the emir Abdullah the British military forces were send to Kuwait to protect its independence from the Iraqi aggression. The British soldiers have stationed on the Kuwait soil till the October 1961, when they were released by the Arab League Security Forces. The Kuwait-Iraq crisis had ended in 1963 when the Kassim?s regime has been overthrown. After that, the new Iraqi government came into agreement with Kuwait and abandoned the Iraqi claims against its independence. The main aim of this paper is to answer the question if the British military intervention was really justified in the light of the Iraqi claims. The other aim is to asset the influence of the British intervention on the relations with the state of the Kuwait. The main thesis of this paper is that because of the crisis the Kuwait authorities were not ready to denounce the 1961 British military commitments. The Iraq-Kuwait crisis had strengthened the Kuwait-British relations and enabled to prolong the British military presence in the Gulf till the end of the 60's.

Paperpresenter: Mansouria Mokhefi (Chargée de cours- INALCO), "Kennedy et la guerre d'Algérie".
John F. Kennedy fut l’un des premiers dirigeants américains à reconnaître l’importance du nationalisme dans les pays colonisés et à plaider pour l’indépendance de l’Algérie, faisant valoir que la guerre en Algérie affaiblit la France en tant que membre de l’Organisation atlantique et compromet les efforts qu’elle entreprend pour la réunification de l’Europe et le développement de l’Afrique noire. S’il s’attache en tant que Sénateur à démontrer par ses prises de positions qu’il n’était pas incompatible de soutenir l’autodétermination et l’intérêt national, il allait, une fois Président, avoir beaucoup de mal à trouver une voie et une réponse différentes de celles de ses prédécesseurs. Les tactiques et le ton allaient changer par rapport à l’Administration Eisenhower, mais guère la teneur des politiques, théoriques ou réelles. En effet, le Président Kennedy se trouva confronté au même dilemme que ses prédécesseurs: comment promouvoir le principe de l’anticolonialisme sans mettre en danger les intérêts des États-Unis en matière de sécurité? Et il se retrouva prisonnier des mêmes postulats qui avaient guidé d’autres Cold Warriors avant lui, tels que Dean Acheson et John Foster Dulles. Comme il l’avait écrit « ce n’est pas de l’anticolonialisme sentimental et dogmatique, mais les dures réalités du monde dans lequel nous vivons, qui engagent tous les États à aider à rechercher une solution en Algérie», Kennedy lui même fut amené à mettre en sourdine tout anticolonialisme sentimental lorsqu’il se trouva confronté aux « dures réalités du monde ». Et nonobstant l’intérêt personnel exprimé par Kennedy et malgré son importance politique et stratégique, la question algérienne n’a jamais revêtu aux yeux des Américains le même caractère d’urgence et de gravité que les autres questions auxquelles l’Administration Kennedy était confrontée au début des années 60. Certes, l’Administration de Kennedy est demeurée concernée par la prolongation de la guerre en Algérie et vigilante quant à toute extension possible du conflit dans la région mais, elle n’a jamais cessé de soutenir le gouvernement français jusque dans ses encouragements pour faire aboutir les négociations avec le FLN.